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ABSTRACT: According to contextualist and other content-relativist views in metaethics, different speakers 
use the same moral and normative sentences to say different things.  These views face a classic problem 
of Lost Disagreement, which they attempt to solve by identifying pragmatic, non-content-based kinds of 
disagreement.  This paper critically compares two broad strategies of this kind, (1) quasi-expressivist views 
that analyze disagreement over whether S ought to do A in terms of conflicting attitudes toward S doing 
A, and (2) metalinguistic views that analyze such disagreement in terms of conflicting attitudes toward 
how to talk about S’s doing A.  While the main objection to quasi-expressivist views (concerning the 
felicity of semantic negation markers like ‘wrong’, ‘incorrect’, and ‘false’) fails, objections to metalinguistic 
views are argued to be decisive.  Content-relativists should be quasi-expressivists about fundamental 
normative disagreement. 
 
Consider the following, familiar metaethical view: 
Content-Relativism:  Different speakers use the same moral sentences, e.g. of the 
form ‘S ought to do A’, to say different things.1 
For example, we might suppose that if Immanuel were to assert, ‘One ought to tell the truth 
even to axe-wielding murderers,’ he would be saying that telling the truth even to axe-wielding 
murderers is necessary for acting on a universalizable maxim, while if Jeremy were to assert the 
same sentence he would be saying that telling the truth even to axe-wielding murderers is 
necessary for maximizing happiness.  Content-relativist views have appealed to many 
philosophers, at least since Westermarck (1906-08, 1932), for a variety of reasons including: 
their promise to identify what in the world moral claims could be about (solve the “location 
problem”), to explain the diversity in moral opinion, and (more recently) to fit into a unifying 
semantic treatment of modal terms like ‘ought’ now orthodox in linguistics.  For almost as 
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 Content-relativism is a broad category, which includes (many) indexical views that liken moral words to indexicals 
such as ‘I’ and ‘now’, (many) more broadly contextualist views that assign moral words implicit argument-places 
taking different values on different occasions of use, and views on which different speakers simply use moral 
words with different meanings.  However, it excludes the kind of view most commonly labelled ‘relativism’ today, 
which locates the relativity in the truth value rather than the content of moral sentences and utterances.  Note 
that there are also content-absolutist forms of contextualism, as advocated in Dowell ms. 
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long—at least since Moore 1922 (pp. 333-4)—they have been the target of one central 
objection that has widely been considered fatal.2  If two speakers use the same sentence to say 
different things, then when one asserts the sentence and the other asserts its negation, the 
contents of their utterances will not (ipso facto) be inconsistent or incompatible.  However, 
intuitively when one speaker asserts ‘S ought to do A’ and another asserts ‘S ought not to do 
A’—and both intend to make moral, rather than prudential or legal (etc.) claims—they do 
thereby have a moral disagreement.3  Hence, we have the problem of 
Lost Disagreement:  Content-relativist views seem unable to accommodate the 
existence of some intuitive cases of normative disagreement. 
This problem is a central motivator of views that embrace the contrary thesis, 
Content-Absolutism:  Different speakers always use the same moral sentences to 
say the same things. 
Absolutism comes in both cognitivist and noncognitivist varieties, with cognitivist absolutism 
holding that a moral sentence always has the same descriptive content (in virtue of its 
normative terms, at least, setting aside other contextually variable words like ‘you’ and ‘now’), 
and noncognitivist absolutism holding that a moral sentence always has the same attitudinal 
content.  Parallel problems familiarly arise for many other words of philosophical interest, 
including aesthetic predicates (‘fun’, ‘tasty’) and epistemic modals (‘might’), and there are 
rapidly expanding and roughly parallel literatures addressed to these analogous problems.  
While this paper focuses on the metaethical case, I expect its points will also apply, in general 
and mutatis mutandis, to content-relativism in these other debates. 
Content-relativists have typically responded to the Problem of Lost Disagreement (since at least 
Harman 1996: Ch. 3) 4 by challenging the assumption that disagreement requires utterances 
                                                          
2
 See the list of references in Khoo & Knobe 2016: 4n, for example.  
3
 Strictly the negated form is ‘It is not the case that S ought to do A’, but for convenience I’ll assume that this is 
entailed by ‘S ought not to do A’, as on standard deontic logics. 
4
 Harman is not himself strictly a content-relativist, since he advances relativism as a charitable reinterpretation of 
ordinary (absolutist) moral claims for the purpose of assigning truth rather than as an account of what those claims 
ordinarily mean (1996: 17). 
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with inconsistent or incompatible contents, and locating the disagreement somewhere else.  
(This includes my own work; see Björnsson & Finlay 2010, Finlay 2014: Ch. 8).  But I think it’s fair 
to say that philosophers not already convinced of content-relativism have generally seen this 
non-content-based strategy as an implausible and desperate move to save a theory.  As some 
have complained (e.g. Thomson 1996: 196f, Olson 2011), the various moves made in the service 
of this strategy can seem gratuitously complex compared to the simpler accounts of 
disagreement offered by content-absolutist views. 
This debate has seen two major developments over roughly the last five years.  First, 
proponents of this non-content-based disagreement strategy have gone on the offensive, 
offering various kinds of evidence that as a matter of fact, much ordinary moral or normative 
disagreement does not involve utterances with inconsistent or incompatible contents.  So it is 
suggested that it is actually the absolutist, not the relativist, who has some explaining to do.  As 
Khoo and Knobe (2016) put it, “not only is it not problematic for a theory if it fails to predict 
exclusionary content in all cases of moral disagreement, but it is problematic for a theory if it 
does predict exclusionary content in all cases of moral disagreement.”5  I know this claim will 
raise some eyebrows,6 so while it isn’t my purpose in this paper to argue for the strategy, I’ll 
quickly list some of the kinds of evidence I have in mind: 
(i) Widespread intuitions that in some (especially cross-cultural) cases of apparent moral 
disagreement, it might be that neither party, or judgments, are “wrong” or “incorrect” 
(as experimentally found by Sarkissian et al. 2011), even though these were judged to 
be real disagreements, in which responses of “no” are appropriate (Khoo & Knobe 
2016).7 
(ii) Intuitive asymmetries in normative disagreement—i.e. A intuitively disagrees with B, but 
B doesn’t intuitively disagree with A—whereas inconsistency is a symmetrical relation 
                                                          
5
 Also Finlay 2014: 245, Bolinger ms. 
6
 An informal poll of the audience at the 2016 ChillMeta Workshop suggested that content-relativism remains 
extremely unpopular among contemporary metaethicists, as by my estimate less than 5% of respondents indicated 
sympathy for the view. 
7
 To my knowledge nobody has surveyed intuitions specifically for ‘that’s false’ in the metaethical case, although 
Khoo (2015) finds intuitions that it is inappropriate in the parallel case of disagreement involving epistemic modals. 
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(Ross & Schroeder 2013, Finlay 2014: 228, Khoo & Knobe 2016: 30; cf. Dietz 2008 on 
epistemic disagreement). 
(iii) Experimental findings that in cases of “fundamental” normative disagreement between 
people who accept diverging norms, speakers often employ prosody or vocal stress in 
ways that are known indicators of non-content-based disagreement (Bolinger ms). 
The second development is that the marketplace of ideas is newly flooded with many different 
relativist proposals about where the lost disagreement can be found.  This includes at least 
Robinson 2009, Björnsson & Finlay 2010, Sundell 2011, Wong 2011, Plunkett & Sundell 2013, 
Khoo & Knobe 2016, Silk ms-a, ms-b, 2016, Bolinger ms.8  Consequently, content-relativists 
today find ourselves confronting a new, more amiable problem about disagreement: a Problem 
of Found Disagreement. 
Found Disagreement: There are multiple competing candidates for non-content-
based moral/normative disagreement in cases of intuitive 
disagreement where content-relativists deny there is any 
inconsistent content. 
I’m reminded here of a sequence in Herge’s graphic novel Tintin in America.  Tasked with 
finding the kidnapped dog Snowy, a hotel detective turns up with an assortment of dogs: “You 
lost a dog? …One single dog?  Well, sir…I found you seventeen.  And every one a pedigree 
pooch!”  Which (if any) of these newly proposed kinds of disagreement is correctly identified as 
the lost disagreement—the moral or normative disagreement that is of central concern in 
metaethics—rather than kinds of disagreement that we weren’t even looking for?  This paper is 
an attempt at answering this question. 
An initial but not necessarily simple task is to survey and classify the different species of 
solutions.  The various proposals in the literature are formulated in different frameworks and 
language, and are often put forward without much acknowledgment or even awareness of each 
other.  It isn’t always easy to say how they are different or similar.  What is needed is a careful 
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 Not to mention relevant proposals directed at parallel disagreement problems in epistemology, aesthetics, etc. 
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critical comparison that identifies the central distinguishing features of the different views on 
the playing field, and surveys their virtues and vices.  In this paper I attempt to make a first step 
in this direction by comparing views falling on either side of a single distinction. 
Extant relativist strategies for identifying non-content-based disagreement share a considerable 
amount in common.  (1) They generally turn on the observation that utterances can 
communicate or express more than what they say (their content).  This makes them pragmatic 
solutions, on a broad definition of ‘pragmatics’.9  (2) They locate the disagreement in 
(somehow) conflicting attitudes, which are pragmatically expressed or, in cases of 
disagreement in judgment alone, simply held.  There is room for a variety of views on what 
kinds of attitudes those are; most accounts appeal to noncognitive or pro/con attitudes of 
some kind—for familiar reasons concerning the practical roles of normative judgment—but 
here we can stay neutral on this issue.10  The major fault-line that particularly interests me here 
concerns the object of these conflicting attitudes. 
The existing proposals seem largely to divide into two camps, even though many other 
approaches are surely possible.11  On one hand, there are views according to which (some) 
utterances of ‘S ought1 to do A’ and ‘S ought2 not to do A’ stand in a relationship of normative 
disagreement by virtue of expressing conflicting attitudes towards the event-type, S does A.  In 
this category we find at least Gil Harman (1996), David Wong (2011) and Gunnar Björnsson and 
myself (Björnsson & Finlay 2010, Finlay 2014).12  I call this a quasi-expressivist account of 
disagreement: like expressivism it focuses on the attitude expressed by an utterance, but unlike 
                                                          
9
 This includes but isn’t limited to conversational implicature views, as found in Copp 1997, 2001, Finlay 2004, 
Strandberg 2012.  Even on a broad definition, conventional implicature views, like those offered in Slote 1968, 
Barker 1999, and Copp 2001, fall into a grey area, as do presuppositional views, as in Perl ms.  See Sundell 2011 for 
a catalog of kinds of pragmatic disagreement. 
10
 See Perl ms. for a cognitivist account of pragmatic disagreement.  Some of the views classified below as 
“metalinguistic” talk instead about conflicting proposals.  Classifying these as “attitudes” may be awkward, but 
makes no difference for the arguments of this paper. 
11
 Björnsson 2015 offers an account of non-content-based disagreement that doesn’t obviously fit into either 
camp, for example.  I do not address his account (in terms of judgments that fail to fulfill the communicative 
function of a claim) in this paper. 
12
 Possibly also Dreier 2009, Sundell 2011: 282.  Broadly parallel accounts of disagreement involving epistemic 
modals and other kinds of claims are offered by Dietz 2008, Montminy 2012, Huvenes 2014, Lennertz 2014. 
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expressivism-proper it attributes this to pragmatics rather than to semantics or meaning.13  
With tongue in cheek, I’ll abbreviate this as: 
QED: Moral utterances of ‘S ought/ought not to do A’ with consistent contents 
sometimes stand in a relation of moral disagreement by virtue of pragmatically 
expressing conflicting attitudes towards the event-type, S does A. 
On the other hand, there are views according to which utterances of ‘S ought1 to do A’ and ‘S 
ought2 not to do A’ sometimes stand in a relationship of moral or normative disagreement by 
virtue of expressing conflicting attitudes towards something like the use of the word ‘ought’ (or 
more broadly, what to do) in the conversational context.  Such an approach is explicitly 
championed by David Plunkett and Tim Sundell (2013), Justin Khoo and Josh Knobe (2016), and 
Renee Bolinger (ms), and is also suggested by some claims of Denis Robinson (2009, 2010) and 
Alex Silk (ms-a, ms-b, 2016).14  These views are commonly labeled metalinguistic, hence: 
MLD: Moral utterances of ‘S ought/ought not to do A’ with consistent contents 
sometimes stand in a relation of moral disagreement by virtue of pragmatically 
expressing conflicting attitudes towards the metalinguistic proposition, if a 
speaker x is in context C, then x uses ‘ought’ with meaning M. 
This is only a rough and preliminary gloss on the metalinguistic approach, and some of the 
philosophers listed above may object to this characterization, if not to my classification of them 
itself.  I work through some different formulations below in trying to do justice to their views. 
It is important to acknowledge that QED and MLD are not mutually exclusive.  Indeed several 
writers (myself included) have given voice to both views in different places.  This may be partly 
due to a failure to distinguish between them, as their differences have so far received little if 
any attention, but there’s also no clear reason why a proponent of one of these views should 
deny the existence of disagreements of the other kind.  If two speakers have conflicting 
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 See Björnsson & Finlay 2010, Finlay 2014: 140.  Harman uses the label quasi-absolutist, which highlights a 
different feature of this kind of view.  Note that many metalinguistic views could be classified as broadly quasi-
expressivist as well, but here I use it as a label of convenience in contradistinction to ‘metalinguistic’. 
14
 Pekka Väyrynen also proposed such an account to me in conversation in 2008. 
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attitudes towards S’s doing A, then we can expect them also normally to have conflicting 
attitudes towards how normative words are used in relation to S’s doing A, and vice versa.  
There is more room for reasonable debate over which is more deserving of the label of 
moral/normative disagreement, but even here it may be that the right verdict will ultimately 
turn out to be pluralistic, recognizing the existence of different species of moral/normative 
disagreement.15  But as you might expect, in this paper my provisional findings are in favor of 
QED over MLD. 
To be clear, I’m in complete agreement with the metalinguistic theorists that fundamental 
moral and normative discourse often involves metalinguistic disagreement, which contributes 
to the appeal of MLD accounts.  What I’m less convinced of is that this is correctly identified as 
the lost moral/normative disagreement that motivates metaethicists’ rejection of content-
relativism.  This lost disagreement, I believe, is more appropriately glossed as being over 
whether S ought to do A.  I first consider a series of objections against MLD, some of which I 
argue to be decisive.  I then consider some objections against QED, which I argue to be 
indecisive. 
1. The Case Against MLD 
The most general problem I see for MLD is that it intuitively mislocates the disagreement.16  
When we talk about moral disagreement between speakers uttering ‘S ought to do A’/ ‘S ought 
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 See also Sundell 2011, Bolinger ms.  In Finlay 2014: Ch. 8, I distinguish four kinds of normative disagreement. 
16
 It has been suggested that “fundamental” moral or normative disagreements fail a central linguistic test for 
metalinguistic negation, of resisting neg-incorporation.  (For relevant discussion, see Plunkett & Sundell 2013: 33, 
Bolinger ms).  Consider first: 
(1) B: The miners are either in shaft A or shaft B. 
C1: No, they’re not either in shaft A or shaft B; they’re in A. 
C2: #No, they’re neither in shaft A nor shaft B; they’re in A. 
This exchange features metalinguistic negation directed at the use of ‘either’.  Unlike ordinary content-directed 
negation, morphological incorporation of the negation (not either…or ---> neither…nor), as in C2, is impermissible 
when the negation is metalinguistic.  However, contrast the following exchange, in which (let’s assume) B and C 
endorse different moral standards: 
(2) B: We ought to block shaft A. 
C1: No, it’s not true that we ought to block A; we ought to block B. 
C2: No, we oughtn’t block A; we ought to block B. 
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not to do A’, we seem to be particularly interested in a conflict over what S does (or what S is to 
do).  Identifying this with a conflict over how to talk about what S does seems to miss the most 
salient issue of disagreement.17  By contrast, QED seems to get this right, locating the 
disagreement in a (broadly Stevensonian) conflict of attitudes towards S’s doing A.18 
I find this consideration prima facie compelling in favor of QED over MLD.  But perhaps my 
articulation of the MLD claim has been uncharitable.  On some statements of views that I’ve 
classified above as metalinguistic, the disagreement is characterized not as being over the use 
of words or sentences, but rather as being over the context (hence “metacontextual”).  This is 
open to a variety of interpretations.19  (i) Sometimes it is described as a disagreement about 
what the context is.  Taken at face value this seems clearly mistaken.  (It’s a context where the 
two speakers each favor a different standard.  Where’s the room for disagreement about 
that?)20  (ii) At other times it is described as a disagreement over what the context ought to be 
(or “is to be”): e.g. whether it ought to be a context where everybody accepts standard M1, or 
one where everybody accepts standard M2.  This is more plausibly a normative disagreement, 
and I take it to be the more promising way to reconstruct the MLD approach.  But it sharpens 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
In this case (the worry goes), incorporation of the negation (not ought ---> oughtn’t) is fine, suggesting that the 
disagreement is not metalinguistic. 
There are at least two reasons why MLD theorists shouldn’t be troubled.  First, according to many (contextualist) 
versions of content-relativism, the target of metalinguistic negation (i.e. the part of the first speaker’s utterance 
that the second speaker objects to) is not the word ‘ought’ itself, but rather an argument or relativization of 
‘ought’ which is left implicit.  Since it is just the target of the metalinguistic negation which resists neg-
incorporation, the difference between exchanges (1) and (2) is no problem.  Second, ‘oughtn’t’ is most naturally 
read as a contraction of ‘ought not’, rather than as an neg-incorporated version of ‘not ought’, and so C2 plausibly 
isn’t a case of neg-incorporation at all.  Additionally, Plunkett & Sundell (2013: 33)  argue that metalinguistic 
disagreement need not involve metalinguistic negation.  So we can dismiss this worry. 
17
 It’s tempting to also complain that MLD fails to give an account of disagreement over whether S ought to do A, 
but this might overreach, since metalinguistic disagreements are familiarly described in object-level terms; e.g. it 
seems natural enough to describe a metalinguistic disagreement over the use of ‘bald’ as a disagreement over 
whether S is bald.  However, notice that it isn’t similarly natural to describe this as a disagreement over how much 
hair S has, which corresponds, in the metaethical case, to describing a metalinguistic disagreement as being over 
what S is to do. 
18
 I omit the motive to change the other person’s attitudes that Charles Stevenson includes in his account of 
disagreement in attitude.  Thanks to Giulia Pravato here. 
19
 Cf. Sundell 2011: 279. 
20
 ‘Context’ is likely being used with a different sense here, but other interpretations don’t seem to make this claim 
any more plausible.  E.g. if it is interpreted as meaning a set of parameters accepted as salient by all parties to the 
conversation, or as the “common ground”, then there is (relevantly) no context in these scenarios, and both 
parties to such a disagreement would be mistaken. 
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the mislocation worry.  The question of what context the speakers ought to be in seems prima 
facie too obliquely related to S’s doing A to be the question at issue in moral disagreement over 
whether S ought to do A.21 
Concommitantly, MLD faces difficulties in accounting for the intuitive extension of fundamental 
normative disagreement.22  First, there is a problem of interconversational disagreement: two 
speakers can intuitively be in fundamental normative disagreement while participating in two 
separate conversations at different places and/or times, in which case (we might expect) they 
could not be disagreeing over what context to be in.  (The context of what conversation?)  
Suppose Jeremy says ‘One ought not to tell the truth to axe-wielding maniacs’ while talking to 
John, and Immanuel says ‘One ought to tell the truth even to axe-wielding maniacs’ while 
talking to Gottfried.  We can reasonably think that they have thereby disagreed over what to do 
when confronted by axe-wielding maniacs, without assuming that either has any view at all 
about how to talk when in the conversational circumstances of the other.  (We might even 
suppose that Jeremy agrees with Immanuel about how to talk with Gottfried, because he 
believes that Gottfried perversely always tries to do what he thinks he ought not do.)  By 
contrast, QED seems safe from this objection: two speakers can express conflicting attitudes 
towards S’s doing A without participating in the same conversation. 
Second, people can apparently be in fundamental normative or moral disagreement in 
judgment, without speaking at all.  One could, perhaps, try to accommodate this on MLD as 
involving possession of conflicting attitudes towards what kinds of linguistic contexts to enter, 
or how to talk about S’s doing A in general.23  But this creates further problems, because people 
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 There is also a regress problem here: how is the content-relativist to analyze these second-order ‘ought’s?  It 
seems likely that any reason to be skeptical that there is always a common contested content in first-order cases 
would also be a reason for skepticism about there always being a common contested content in second-order 
cases.  Providing a metalinguistic diagnosis of this second-order disagreement (e.g. disagreement over what 
context to be in when talking about what context to be in when talking about whether S “ought” to do A) looks 
extremely unattractive, but if the MLD theorist offers a different kind of non-content-based strategy at this level, 
she must now explain why we shouldn’t simply apply this different model of non-content-based disagreement at 
the first-order level instead. 
22
 On this issue for content-relativism more generally, see also Lasersohn 2005, MacFarlane 2007: 20, Stephenson 
2007, and discussion in Sundell 2011: 284f. 
23
 For example, Khoo & Knobe suggest analyzing such disagreements “in terms of something about A’s disposition 
to reject certain claims B has made or is disposed to make.” (2016: 30n21) 
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can favor different contexts or speech behaviors for different reasons, and not merely because 
of which moral standards they accept.  For example, I might prefer that Donald Trump 
continues to speak in a racist context or way (e.g. when he says, ‘Undocumented immigrants 
ought to be rounded up and deported’) for the reason that I want him to continue alienating 
reasonable Americans, while you might prefer that he switches to a different context for the 
reason that you fear the ratcheting up of racial tension.  While there is certainly some 
disagreement between us in this scenario, it is surely wrong to say that we thereby disagree 
over whether undocumented immigrants ought to be rounded up and deported.  So, it seems, 
we should not attempt to analyze the latter kind of moral disagreement as a disagreement over 
what context to be in.24  This is a predictable kind of problem if we analyze disagreement over 
whether it ought to be that p in terms of attitudes toward something other than p.  By contrast, 
QED is easily extended to accommodate these cases.  Although no attitudes towards S doing A 
might be expressed in the absence of speech, we can still plausibly identify conflicting attitudes 
held towards that event-type, and identify fundamental normative disagreement in judgment 
about whether it ought to be that p with a conflict in attitudes held towards p. 
At this stage, I anticipate one of two responses from MLD theorists.  The first response 
concedes the points made above, but clarifies that MLD is proposed as an account only of one 
particular sense of disagreement, “activity” disagreement—which occurs when people are 
actively engaged in dispute with one another, contrasting with mere “state” disagreement.25   
This focus is explicit in the treatments of Silk, who labels it “discourse” disagreement (ms-a, ms-
b), and Khoo and Knobe, who label it “conversational” disagreement (2016: 3).  These 
philosophers may therefore protest that the above objections mistake the target of their 
analyses.  In this case, my reply is simply that their MLD theories then do not really address the 
traditional metaethical Problem of Lost Disagreement, which extends to interconversational 
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 It might be objected that the Trump scenario doesn’t involve distinctly moral attitudes on both sides, and for this 
reason doesn’t involve a moral disagreement.  But we can construct structurally identical scenarios involving moral 
attitudes, such as a dispute between a “Government House” Utilitarian who opposes invocation of genuine 
principles of morality in ordinary discourse, and a regular (transparency-favoring) Utilitarian. 
25
 A distinction due to Cappelen & Hawthorne 2009.  This focus is rejected in favor of state disagreements by  
(ironically) the account that most explicitly embraces the metalinguistic label, that of Plunkett and Sundell (2013: 
10-11), precisely for the kinds of extensional issues raised above. 
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and judgment disagreements, and so is more plausibly interpreted as a problem about state 
disagreements. 
The second response rejects my interpretation of MLD strategies as overly narrow.  A champion 
of MLD might respond to these objections in the following way: 
“By context, I just mean a set of parameters or indices, of the kind that modal claims 
take as values.  One such parameter is a standard or end parameter.  So to have or 
express an attitude towards “the context”, in the sense I intend, is simply to have or 
express an attitude (relevantly) towards a standard or end.  Two people can express 
conflicting attitudes of this kind without being in the same conversation, and can 
possess such attitudes without being in a conversation at all.” 
This response would indeed blunt the objections raised above.  But the cost of this route is that 
it threatens to collapse the distinction between MLD and QED, in a way that leaves it simply 
misleading to characterize fundamental normative disagreement as “metalinguistic”, or 
concerned with “linguistic context”.  In no way are these attitudes helpfully understood as 
being directed towards anything “linguistic”.  (Some philosophers I classified above as MLD 
theorists might not see this as a cost, in which case they will turn out to be on the QED side of 
this dispute after all.)26 
There is, however, a difference between having or expressing an attitude toward a 
standard/end, and having or expressing an attitude toward an event-type like S’s doing A.  Since 
I’ve here defined QED narrowly in terms of the latter, there remains a gap between QED and 
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 This paper began as a response to Alex Silk (particularly ms-a, but see also ms-b, 2016), trying to identify a 
difference between our otherwise very similar views.  Silk now explains that his account of normative 
disagreement is neither “metalinguistic” nor “metacontextual”, since “more fundamentally, [the] disagreement 
concerns…what moral norms to accept and why.”  However, this concession to QED at a more fundamental level 
does not, so far as I can see, license his denial that the primary account of (“discourse”) disagreement in Silk ms-a, 
ms-b, and 2016 is metalinguistic/metacontextual.  For example, the “precise sense” he identifies in which such 
speakers disagree, is in their conflict “over the grammatically backgrounded content of what value for the 
contextual deontic premise set variable is determined by the concrete conversational situation” (ms-b).  Also: 
“[This] disagreement is given a precise representation: their utterances carry incompatible assumptions about 
what body of moral norms is operative in their context.  The locus of their disagreement concerns the very 
contextual features which determine the contents of their deontic modal utterances” (2016: 128-9).  One passage 
even seems to imply that all normative disagreement is metacontextual: “Their disagreement, rather, is 
fundamentally normative. It concerns what body of moral norms is operative in their conversational situation.”   
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the metalinguistic thesis so interpreted.  But if MLD leaves things there, it still hasn’t solved its 
mislocation problem.  We cannot plausibly identify moral disagreement over whether S ought 
to do A with disagreement over whether to accept standard M1.
27  First, an individuation 
problem: standards/ends stand to event-types in a one-to-many relationship.  This 
identification would therefore imply that claims about whether S1 ought to do A1 in C1 can be in 
direct disagreement with claims about whether S2 ought to do A2 in C2, where S2, A2, and C2 are 
completely different agents, actions, and circumstances, respectively.  To illustrate with my toy 
example from above, Jeremy would be disagreeing with Immanuel about whether one ought to 
tell the truth to axe-wielding maniacs no less if, instead of saying ‘One ought not tell the truth 
to axe-wielding maniacs,’ he were to say, ‘Magistrates ought sometimes to convict those they 
know to be innocent, for the greater societal good’.  He would still be disagreeing with 
Immanuel, in the same respect and to the same degree, even if he mistakenly believed that his 
favored moral standard did call for telling the truth even to axe-wielding maniacs, so that he 
would assent to Immanuel’s sentence about axe-wielding maniacs if prompted.  This seems 
quite implausible. 
Second, the above response fails to escape another, more general problem for MLD, concerning 
cases of moral/normative agreement with diverging contents.  Suppose speakers B and C 
accept competing moral standards, which as they recognize, happen to converge in licensing 
utterance of ‘S ought to do A’.  It seems natural to say that B and C agree that S morally ought 
to do A, whatever else they might disagree about.  This can’t be content-based agreement, 
since by hypothesis what each says is consistent with the negation of what the other says.  This 
Problem of Lost Agreement is a widely overlooked corollary of the Problem of Lost 
Disagreement, and one which MLD theorists have generally failed to address at all.  The 
difficulty for MLD is that B and C disagree about what standard or end to accept, so it seems we 
can’t locate their moral agreement in a consensus about the context.  By contrast, the QED 
treatment of fundamental disagreement extends without any difficulty to these cases of 
agreement: B and C express or hold converging attitudes towards the event-type of S doing A, 
putting them in (roughly) a Stevensonian agreement in attitude toward it. 
                                                          
27
 This proposal can now be found in Silk ms-b and Perl ms. 
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There is a possible solution to both the individuation and lost agreement problems, which is to 
identify the disagreement/agreement with B and C having conflicting/identical attitudes toward 
the action-type, accepting a standard that calls for S’s doing A.  This solves the individuation 
problem, because such an attitude has a different object from an attitude toward accepting a 
standard that calls for S2’s doing A2.  And it solves the lost agreement problem, because B and C 
can agree on this much even while differing on which particular standard to prefer.28  However, 
this solution introduces its own problems.29  One is that it threatens to render normative claims 
trivially tautologous: ‘[In view of a standard that requires one to tell the truth even to axe-
wielding maniacs,] one ought to tell the truth even to axe-wielding maniacs.’30  At this point it 
becomes unclear why one would opt for content-relativism rather than simply an expressivist 
form of content-absolutism.  (One way to resist this result would be to give diverging 
treatments of how the relevant standard is picked out for the semantic content and how it is 
picked out for the attitudinal content.  But this looks seriously ad hoc.) 
But if the MLD theorist has come this far, then I see no reason for not making one further step, 
which resolves both the individuation and the lost agreement problems without this further 
unpalatable consequence.  If someone has/expresses an attitude favoring standard M, and 
believes/asserts that S’s doing A is called for by M, then they can also be expected to 
have/express an attitude favoring S’s doing A (as I’ve argued in Finlay 2004, 2014, and 
elsewhere).  A conflict/consilience of such attitudes can then be identified with a moral 
disagreement/agreement over whether S ought to do A.  But this just is QED.  So if this is the 
right way to understand the MLD proposal, then there isn’t really any difference between MLD 
and QED at all, except that MLD is misleadingly presented. 
                                                          
28
 Solutions of roughly this kind have now been embraced in both Silk ms-b and Perl ms.   
29
 A reviewer points out that this solution may itself be vulnerable to a further “Government House” objection: 
conceivably someone might accept a standard M, and on this basis judge that S ought to do A, while at the same 
time being opposed to acceptance of standards which, like M, call for S to do A.  If so, we shouldn’t analyze 
agreement/disagreement over whether S ought to do A in terms of consensus/conflict over whether to accept 
such a standard. This problem is avoided by QED. 
30
 Thanks to Zoë Johnson-King here. While this result would strike many as intolerable, it might seem hypocritical 
for me to press this objection, as I have myself suggested that some fundamental normative claims are, in respect 
of their semantic content, tantamount to useful tautologies (Finlay 2009, 2014: Ch. 7).  However, the present 
suggestion on behalf of MLD is much more extreme, as it seems committed to analyzing all moral and normative 
claims as tautologous—since apparently every moral/normative claim is a possible target for fundamental or non-
content-based disagreement and agreement.   
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Before I turn to examine the other side of the coin—potential advantages of MLD over QED—I’ll 
briefly sketch one other, unconnected worry I have about MLD, about transparency.  The 
concern is that metalinguistic analyses are poorly positioned to accommodate the fact that it is 
often—perhaps even usually—very difficult to know whether a moral or normative dispute is 
ultimately grounded in a difference in the basic standards or ends the disagreeing parties 
accept, or rather is grounded in a difference in their beliefs about what their standards or ends 
call for.  (Ought-claims don’t wear subscripts in public).  It follows that it will be even more rare 
that it is mutually recognized by the parties to a moral or normative disagreement that their 
disagreement is of this kind.  On MLD, this implies that it’s very rare that we ever know whether 
we’re arguing about what S is to do, or about what context we are to be in.  This seems a 
difficult implication to swallow.31  By contrast, the nontransparency of fundamental 
disagreement doesn’t pose a serious problem for QED, because regardless of whether the 
source of the disagreement is a difference in standards/ends or a difference in beliefs about 
what conforms with those standards/ends (which may well not be transparent), there will be 
the same kind of disagreement in attitude toward S’s doing A. 
 
2. The Case Against QED 
I am only aware of one advantage that MLD is alleged to have over QED as an account of 
normative disagreement, which concerns their treatments of “expressions of linguistic denial” 
(Plunkett & Sundell 2013, Silk ms-a, ms-b, 2016, Khoo & Knobe 2016, Bolinger ms).  Contrast 
the following, adapted from Silk (ms-a): 
(1) B: Elmer ought to receive the inheritance. 
C1: No, Elmer ought not to receive the inheritance. 
C2: That’s false, Elmer ought not to receive the inheritance. 
 
                                                          
31
 But contrast Sundell 2011: 277, Plunkett & Sundell 2013: 20. 
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(2) B: I like Mexican. 
C1: #? No, I like Thai. 
C2: # That’s false, I like Thai. 
Exchange (1) is a paradigmatic case of normative disagreement, and a variety of kinds of 
negation markers, including ‘No’ and ‘That’s incorrect/wrong/false’ are (it’s claimed) perfectly 
fine.  Exchange (2)—occurring in a context of conversation about where B and C are going to 
have dinner together—is a paradigmatic case of an expressed conflict in attitudes about an 
event-type.  (Note that the relevant conflict here consists not in B liking Mexican food and C 
liking Thai food, but rather in B’s preferring that B and C together have Mexican for dinner and 
C’s preferring, incompatibly, that B and C together have Thai for dinner.)  In this case, negation 
markers that seem fine in (1) are clearly out of place.   
It’s important to note that this data is ambiguous and contested.  First, although some 
philosophers (e.g. Silk ms-a) claim that ‘no’ is infelicitous in an exchange like (2), I think it can be 
perfectly fine once an appropriate conversational context has been made clear.  For example, 
B: “Where shall we go for dinner?  I like Mexican.”  C: “No, I like Thai.”  On the other hand, 
responses like ‘You’re wrong/mistaken’ and ‘That’s false/incorrect’ are much more clearly 
infelicitous in (1) than in (2) (McKenna 2014, Dowell ms).  We’ve already observed, however, 
that empirical studies have found that many people still find them infelicitous in many 
normative exchanges (Sarkissian et al 2011, Khoo & Knobe 2016); I’ll return to this complication 
below. 
In any case, the difference in felicity of ‘that’s incorrect/wrong/false’ between exchanges like 
(1) and those like (2) poses a challenge for QED.  As (1) shows, mere conflicts in (noncognitive) 
attitudes do not in general license use of these negation markers.  But according to QED, 
fundamental normative disagreements just are such conflicts of attitudes.  So it seems 
potentially embarrassing for QED that use of these markers is (more) felicitous for expressing 
fundamental normative disagreement.  (In Björnsson & Finlay 2010 we label this the “semantic 
assessment problem”).  By contrast, it is well-established that metalinguistic disagreement 
licenses a full range of negation markers.  So this looks like a point in favor of MLD.  Can QED 
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provide a satisfactory explanation why normative disagreements differ from expressed conflicts 
of attitude generally, in licensing these negation markers?  Here I’ll explore three different 
responses to the challenge. 
A first, simple response is for QED theorists simply to help themselves to the metalinguistic 
explanation of these markers.  As I’ve observed, there is no incompatibility between quasi-
expressivist and metalinguistic forms of disagreement, and QED needn’t deny that there is 
sometimes, often, or even ubiquitously metalinguistic disagreement going on when speakers 
engage in non-content-based moral disagreement.  This response does not collapse QED into 
MLD, because here metalinguistic disagreement is invoked merely as an explanation of the use 
of negation markers like ‘incorrect’, ‘wrong’, and ‘false’, and not as an proposal to locate the 
lost disagreement over whether S ought to do A.  To the extent that this semantic behavior is all 
that a particular MLD theorist is trying to explain, there therefore needn’t be any dispute 
between us.  However, an appeal to metalinguistic disagreement might arguably be 
insufficiently general.  It seems that speakers can also use ‘incorrect’, ‘wrong’ or ‘false’ in 
evaluating people’s moral judgments or opinions, and their moral claims in other conversations, 
and so the extensional problems for MLD raised above might create difficulties here too.  In this 
respect, a QED-based solution might even be superior.32 
A second idea is to identify the target of ‘incorrect’, ‘that’s false’, etc. as something else that 
can be associated with the other’s utterance, besides the asserted content.  Pointing to the 
attitude expressed is a nonstarter here, given that the challenge is to explain the divergence 
between exchanges like (1) and (2).  But there are other possibilities, such as (i) the sentence, 
(ii) something subsentential or subpropositional, like the predicate (e.g. “that’s not true of x”), 
and (iii) the speech act.  In earlier work (2010), to try to locate a propositional target for ‘that’s 
false’ Gunnar Björnsson and I proposed that it engages with the sentence used, by targeting the 
                                                          
32
 One might also wonder whether MLD faces an equal but reverse problem of explaining the infelicity of C2 in (2).  
In principle, the metalinguistic story looks like it could extend to such conversations.  By saying ‘That’s false; I like 
Thai’, C would thereby reject B’s assumption that their context is (or should be) one where B is the individual 
whose preferences determine where they go, instead proposing that the determinative preferences be those of C.  
One might argue that some element(s) of my QED-based solution below are necessary conditions for felicitous 
MLD disagreement using semantic negation markers. 
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proposition that the sentence would semantically express if used in the responder’s preferred 
context (standards/ends) rather than the speaker’s.  In the case of exchange (1), this is the 
proposition that Elmer ought-relative-to-MC (C’s standard) to receive the inheritance.  Since this 
is the proposition that C most relevantly (from C’s point of view) rejects, we argued that C can 
felicitously respond to B by targeting this proposition with ‘that’s false’—thereby also 
pragmatically expressing a negative attitude toward Elmer receiving the inheritance. 
Whatever you might think of this proposal, it successfully identifies a difference between 
exchanges (1) and (2).  For in the case of (2), B’s sentence (‘I like Mexican’) cannot be used, in 
anybody’s mouth, to assert the proposition that C is most relevantly interested in rejecting, 
which concerns rather B and C’s together going to dinner at a Mexican restaurant.  This is a 
meaningless victory, however, since we can easily come up with a modified version of (2) where 
this difference evaporates: 
(3)  B: I prefer that we have Mexican for dinner. 
 C: #That’s false. 
Clearly, there isn’t an available reading of C’s response as denying the proposition that C prefers 
that they have Mexican for dinner, even though that is what B’s sentence would semantically 
express in C’s mouth, given the indexicality of ‘I’.  But without some further story, that’s what 
our proposal would seem to predict (Lennertz 2014). 
For this and other reasons (including the scruple that ‘that’s incorrect/wrong/false’ should refer 
to something that the responder believes the speaker actually put forward by her utterance), I 
no longer favor that solution—at least by itself.  A further (complementary) solution is to 
appeal to semantic opacity.33  Even if a content-relativist (e.g. contextualist) theory of the 
semantics of normative language is correct, it is evident that ordinary speakers do not in 
general have a reflective or theoretical awareness of this fact.  Observe how controversial 
content-relativism is in metaethics, even among the supposed experts.  Given (i) this semantic 
                                                          
33
 Often discussed under the label of ‘semantic blindness’.  For a fuller discussion see Finlay 2014: 236-45, and for 
parallel appeals to address problems of lost disagreement involving ‘knows’ and ‘might’, see Montminy 2009 and 
Bach 2009, respectively. 
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opacity, (ii) that according to QED there really is a kind of normative disagreement being 
expressed whenever one speaker makes the moral claim ‘S ought1 to do A’ and another makes 
the moral claim ‘S ought2 not to do A’, and (iii) that these utterances do have ordinary 
propositional contents, we can reasonably expect that in ordinary moral discourse speakers 
would assume that they are disagreeing over a single proposition.  If this is right, it suffices to 
explain the use of negation markers like ‘incorrect’, ‘wrong’, and ‘false’ in exchanges like (1)—
an explanation that clearly doesn’t overgeneralize to conversations like (3) or (2), since no 
sensible person fails to recognize that content-relativism is true for the pronoun ‘I’.  This 
solution is also easily extended to the assessment of private moral judgments and moral claims 
made in other conversations. 
To further support this explanation, recall the final objection I raised against MLD theories, 
concerning the nontransparency of whether or not a normative disagreement is fundamental 
(involves a difference in standards/ends).  This nontransparency works in favor of QED here, as 
it provides a further reason why speakers engaged in a fundamental disagreement might fail to 
recognize that there is no content-based disagreement between them.  Often, and perhaps 
even usually, moral or normative disagreement is (at least in part) disagreement over a 
common proposition, and it is often hard to distinguish when this is and when it isn’t the case.  
This lends further credibility to the hypothesis that speakers assume their moral disagreement 
is content-based even when it isn’t. 
Finally, to keep this semantic assessment problem in perspective it is important not to forget 
that the evidence for the felicity of semantic negation markers is far from univocal.  Recall the 
experimental findings of a statistically significant resistance in ordinary subjects toward the use 
of markers like ‘incorrect’, ‘wrong’, and ‘false’ in the context of (clearly and explicitly) 
fundamental disagreements (Sarkissian et al. 2011, Khoo & Knobe 2016).  Such a reticence fits 
well with the QED account of these disagreement, given the observed datum that mere 
conflicts in attitudes (as in exchange (2)) do not in general license such use. 
Of course, throwing the kitchen sink at the negation marker problem as I am doing here raises 
further issues, since some of the responses I’ve just offered seem to cut in opposing directions: 
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my appeals to metalinguistic disagreement and the observed resistance to negation markers 
suggest a certain level of semantic transparency, in prima facie tension with my appeal to 
semantic opacity.  However, it seems fair to characterize the overall evidence as ambiguous, in 
a way that QED is well-placed to explain but that is potentially awkward for rival treatments of 
moral and normative disagreement including MLD.  Metaethical controversy over content-
relativism, together with the fact that the experimental findings are of a merely statistically 
significant—but far from universal—reticence with negation markers, point toward an 
intermediate degree of semantic opacity, such that awareness of the truth of content-relativism 
apparently varies from person to person, and on the spectrum between tacit and explicit.  It 
seems a plausible hypothesis that the extent to which individual speakers are resistant to 
markers like ‘incorrect’, ‘wrong’, and ‘false’ varies corresponding to the degree they are aware 
of the content-relativity of normative utterances. 
The conclusion of this paper is therefore that whereas metalinguistic accounts of moral or 
normative disagreement face serious problems—problems that force them in the direction of 
quasi-expressivism—the main challenge raised against quasi-expressivist accounts is amenable 
to a well-motivated solution.  With respect to the choice between these two strategies, 
content-relativists should identify fundamental moral and normative disagreement over 
whether S ought to do A with a conflict of attitudes towards S doing A: QED.34 
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